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Abstract 
 
For almost a decade before Hollywood existed, French firm Pathe towered over the early film 
industry with estimates of its share of all films sold around the world varying between 50-
70%. Pathe was the first global entertainment company. This paper analyses its rise to market 
leadership by applying a theoretical framework drawn from the business literature on causes 
of industry dominance, which provides insights into how firms acquire and maintain market 
dominance, and in this case the film industry. This paper uses evidence presented by film 
historians to argue that Pathe “fits” the expected theoretical model of a dominant firm because 
it had a marketing orientation, used an effective quality-based competitive strategy and 
possessed the six critical strategic marketing capabilities that business research shows enable 
the best performing firms to consistently outperform rivals. 
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Introduction 
At the end of the 19th century, whilst the upper classes continued to enjoy ‘high culture’ in 
the form of performing arts such as ballet, opera, music concerts and live theatre as they had 
done for centuries, in an urbanising America, popular amusements available to an emerging 
middle class and the working class were either location-based events such as amusement 
parks, professional sporting events e.g. boxing and wrestling, popular plays, vaudeville, 
burlesque, hotels or taverns, local dances and church socials or were travelling road-shows 
such as  circuses, fairs, carnivals, showboats, minstrel shows, wild west shows and wagon 
shows (Csida and Csida 1978,62-68). Alternatively, people could enjoy home-based 
amusements such as playing pianos, listening to Thomas Edison’s new phonographs and for 
the literate – there were dime novels, magazines and newspapers (Mott 1938). Electronic 
media as mass entertainment did not yet exist and there were no globally spread media 
organisations controlling what people saw and heard, until the advent of cinema. 
In 1893, Thomas Edison invented a machine that filmed moving pictures and for an 
eighteen month period, his device - the kinetoscope, a coin-operated single-viewer peephole 
machine that enabled a person to see a flickering, silent moving picture that lasted about one 
minute in duration, became a wondrous novelty that spread rapidly around the world 
appearing in amusement arcades and what was known as kinetoscope parlours.  However, 
within two years the kinetoscope was superseded by a new technology and the cinema was 
born. 
France’s Lumiere brothers invented the film projector and screened the first moving 
pictures to an audience in Paris in 1895 and in doing so, laid the foundations for a 
commercial cinema industry to develop twenty years before the Hollywood studios became 
the world’s most successful film corporations. 
Leading film industry trade paper Variety stated: ’from 1900 to 1914 the French 
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dominated the world market but lost it to America during the war years‘ (Moskowitz 1956). 
Initially, the leading French studios were the Lumiere brothers and Georges Melies’ Star 
Films, however within the first decade of the new industry, they were overtaken by Pathe 
Freres, another French film company that reigned over the global film industry until WWI. 
Historians and trade journals estimate Pathe’s dominance in world markets to range from 50-
70% (Cawkell and Smith 1972; Puttnam 1997, 43; Segrave 1997; Abel 1999, 48; 57; 
Hayward 2000, 196).  
In fact, Pathe created the first global entertainment empire, which raises an interesting 
question – how was a firm founded in 1896, able to become the dominant film company in 
the world in approximately a decade? This paper seeks to answer that question. It briefly 
discusses theories drawn from the business literature (economics, strategic management and 
marketing) that explain how firms become market leaders and dominate an industry. It then 
integrates those explanations into a theoretical lens to facilitate an analysis of Pathe’s rise to a 
position of global leadership in the evolving pre-Hollywood film industry. This theoretical 
approach is patterned after Jones (2001) and is the same method used by Silver (2007) to 
investigate Hollywood’s nine decades of dominance in the movie business. Finally, this paper 
draws some key lessons for contemporary entertainment firms from this historical analysis of 
the rise of the first global entertainment company and from the identification of the structural 
conditions required to create a successful entertainment business of any scale. This paper 
employs the concept of ‘audience-centred culture’ to define entertainment. 
Theoretical framework explaining market dominance 
Rosenbaum (1998) states ’dominance implies power and control‘ and notes that economic 
’structuralists‘ argue that market dominance occurs when there is a high concentration of 
companies of sufficient size and scale and with enough economic clout and market power 
that they can manipulate industry pricing. However, the Chicago school advances a rival 
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theory that firms become dominant and achieve significant market share because they are 
more efficient than their rivals over the long term due to more effective use of company 
resources.  Indicators of market power include a dominant market share, large economies of 
scale, collusion and other forms of cartel behaviour, erection of high barriers-to-entry and use 
of overwhelming marketing force (Shepherd 1972, 25-37). Such indicators signal that a 
firm’s competitive strategy must also play a significant role in the acquisition and 
maintenance of dominance. 
Five routes by which firms acquire market dominance have been identified (Hay and Vickers 
1987, 10-14) however only one of those five routes listed below was a significant 
contributing factor to Pathe’s ascension to market leadership:  
1) Government sanctioned monopoly – this scenario did not apply to Pathe.  
2) Firm growth through mergers – the historical evidence shows that whilst Pathe’s firm did 
merge at its inception with a small precision tool factory – Bunzli and Continsouza (B&C), 
there is no evidence to show that this merger immediately elevated Pathe to a position of 
market dominance due to increased size and scale. What it did do was lay the groundwork for 
Pathe’s backer Claude Grivolas to later raise the necessary capital required for corporate 
growth on the Parisian stock exchange. 
3) Collusion – there is no historical evidence of Pathe colluding during its rise to market 
leadership, however after 1909 it did join the Edison-inspired Motion Picture Patent’s 
Company (MPPC also known as The Trust) that sought to dominate the American industry 
through collusion, however by then Pathe was already the global market leader and it could 
be argued that the MPPC was in fact partially a response from Edison to contain Pathe’s 
growing market power in the American market.  
4) Predatory behaviour seeking to destroy rivals – whilst Pathe used different pricing 
strategies to its American rivals, there is no historical evidence to suggest that it adopted 
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predatory strategies during its rise to market leadership or prior to being drawn into the 
MPPC.  
5) Firm growth due to skill, foresight and industry i.e. superior business performance based 
on a firm’s capabilities, efficient use of resources and a strategic orientation – this is the route 
that will therefore be examined in this paper to explain Pathe’s dominance. 
Strategically orientated firms seek to shape their environment and create a sustainable 
competitive advantage by providing superior performance and value to customers (Aaker and 
Mills 2005, 4-7; Cravens 2000, 5). To achieve that result, as Hay and Vickers (1987) 
proposed, they need to demonstrate strategic foresight. This requires them to be outwardly 
focused and attuned to the trends and shifts in the business environment and to changes in 
consumer tastes and market demand.  
Business literature shows that a marketing orientation is positively correlated to 
superior business performance (Day 1994; Deshpande, Farley and Webster 1993; Jaworski 
and Kohli 1992; Narver and Slater 1990) and that market-driven firms possessing superior 
marketing capabilities in six areas continually outperform less market-driven rivals on four 
critical dimensions –firm growth, customer satisfaction, adaptability and profitability 
(Vorhies and Harker 2000). 
Six common core capabilities of marketing-driven firms  
Field research by Vorhies, Harker and Rao (1999); Vorhies and Harker (2000) and a 
benchmarking study by Vorhies and Morgan (2005) identified six key marketing capabilities 
that typically characterised the best-performing market-driven firms: a) systematic and 
strategic use of marketing research to understand customers and optimise exploitation of 
market potential; b) development of new products that match consumer needs; c) strategic 
use of competitive pricing; d) effective distribution strategy; e) promotional strategies that 
persuade consumers to buy and; f) firm leadership that maintains a responsive strategic 
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orientation and cohesively manages the firm’s marketing mix to satisfy existing and potential 
customers and markets. Four of those six key marketing capabilities – product, price, place 
and promotion comprise elements of the marketing mix, a concept first proposed in 1940 by 
Borden who argued firms needed to strategically manage their key marketing capabilities to 
optimally exploit their marketing resources and the full market potential of their products. 
Pathe’s rise to dominance  
Historical context 
Industries evolve through four lifecycle stages: the first stage is fragmentation - when many 
firms compete in a new industry to find customers and industry structures begin to form; 
shakeout - firms grow organically or via mergers and acquisitions in order to gain greater 
market power, many smaller firms fail in this stage; the third stage is maturity - when a small 
number of profitable large firms have achieved sufficient market power to control the 
industry; this is followed by decline - when industry sales begin to drop as rival industries or 
new technologies offer substitute products e.g. cinema was impacted by the advent of 
television (McGahan, Argyres and Baum 2004). 
 The first decade of the film industry from 1895-1904 was a period of industry 
fragmentation when manufacturers of film equipment (cameras and projectors) tried to find 
customers (exhibitors) to buy their equipment. The manufactures also produced short black 
and white silent films on a variety of topics covering different aspects of everyday life. 
No formal distribution structures or permanent cinemas existed at this time. Moving pictures 
were a novelty that fascinated the public and were exhibited at fairgrounds, amusement 
arcades, vaudeville shows and in cafes in Europe. As film equipment diffused around the 
world, producers emerged in many countries but large equipment manufacturers such as 
Edison, Biograph and Vitagraph in America, and Pathe and Gaumont in France produced the 
majority of short films. 
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Distribution structures in the form of film exchanges began emerging from 1902 and 
the rapidly expanding American economy created the world’s largest cinema market from 
around 1905-1908 with the Nickelodeon boom. This was the beginning of the shakeout stage 
of the industry lifecycle and the timeframe that marked Pathe’s rise to market leadership and 
dominance. 
Box office sales statistics are not available for this period but Table 1 below is based 
on the number of films produced annually by each of the major film companies operating in 
the U.S. market and shows that American firms Edison and Biograph dominated that market 
from 1895 until 1906. After this time Pathe released more films than both of them combined. 
Only George Kleine – a film distributor, released a similar number of films to Pathe and most 
of his release slate, were imported European films. 
Table 1. Total film releases in U.S. market 1895-1905 and from 1906-1910 
 Nation Total 
U.S. 
releases  
1895-
1905 
Market 
Share 
Total 
U.S. 
releases  
1906-
1910 
Market 
Share 
Edison U.S. 2082 23% 492 3.5% 
Biograph U.S. 3510 38.5% 578 4.2% 
Pathe France 298 3.3% 1842 13.3% 
Kleine U.S. 494 5.4% 1518 11% 
Lubin U.S. 1244 13.7% 752 5.4% 
Gaumont France 86 0.95% 800 5.8% 
Motion Picture  
Distributors & Sales  
U.S. 0 0 760 5.5% 
Selig U.S. 345 3.8% 334 2.4% 
Vitagraph U.S. 16 0.2% 628 4.5% 
Total films in U.S. market  9121  13852  
Total European Share of 
U.S. market 
  9.6%  30% 
Total American share of 
U.S. market 
  90.4%  70% 
Source: Savada AFI catalog 
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French firms had early access to capital required for growth 
One of the key drivers of company growth is efficient use of resources. Only two of the 
American majors had access to significant capital during that time – Edison and Biograph. 
The others – Lubin, Selig, Essanay, Kalem and Vitagraph began with low start up capital but 
grew organically over time into major American studios in the pre-Hollywood era. 
Edison’s film division was a small part of his much larger business empire. His 
company employed 3500 staff, manufactured 6,000 phonographs per week and 130,000 
moulded phonograph records per day that were distributed to retail customers across America 
through 150 jobbers and over 13,000 dealers (Dyer and Martin 1910, 672-673).  Edison’s 
company was also a major player in the electricity industry (Reich 1992, 305) and would 
later become General Electric (GE). 
Biograph became an ‘instant’ major studio when it used the patents for its camera and 
projector as security to obtain a start-up loan from the New York Security & Trust Company 
which provided $200,000 in working capital and enabled Biograph to rapidly expand its 
business manufacturing film equipment and begin producing films to supply with that 
equipment (Balio 1985, 11).  Biograph targeted the highly competitive vaudeville market as a 
customer base for its equipment and was exclusively contracted to supply the prestigious 
Keith vaudeville theatre circuit with a package comprising projector, technician and films for 
its coast-to-coast circuit of high-class vaudeville theatres (Abel 1999, 3).  Biograph’s 
equipment had a superior reputation for quality compared to Edison’s cameras and projectors 
(Zukor 1953, 20).  
In France, the Lumiere brothers were self-financed, coming from a prosperous 
bourgeois family, and Georges Melies had inherited a stake in the successful family shoe 
business enabling him to run a popular magic theatre in Paris and to make films (Abel 1994, 
10-14).  Leon Gaumont owned a photography shop in Paris and upon entering the moving 
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picture industry he was backed by a team of investors led by Guastav Eiffel, who floated the 
company in 1905 and raised 2.5 million francs in capital (Kindem 2000, 195). 
Charles Pathe operated a gramophone manufacturing and sales business prior to 
forming Pathe Frères with his brother Emile and creating a film division. In the first few 
years, gramophone sales underwrote the embryonic film activities and provided 90% of the 
cash flow during which time Pathe developed a film processing laboratory and a movie 
studio complex at Vincennes outside Paris. By 1906,  ‘66% of company revenues came from 
film’ (Puttnam 1997, 26). 
Pathe found a “business angel” with significant business skills  
Claude Grivolas was a successful industrialist and part-time magician who had become 
fascinated with film and wanted to invest in its future. After his initial overtures to invest in 
Melies’ studio were rejected, Grivolas developed a relationship with Pathe through a 
precision tool factory that he owned - B & C (Bunzli & Continsouza), which became the sub-
contracting manufacturer of cameras and projectors under a Pathe trademark. In 1896 
Grivolas went into partnership with Pathe; B&C merged with Pathe to become its equipment 
manufacturing arm, managed by founding partners Bunzli & Continsouza (MIP 2007). 
Grivolas ran the new company as the first Managing Director, Emile Pathe ran the 
profitable phonograph division and Ferdinand Zecca was hired to run the film studio. This 
allowed the Charles Pathe, with his background in retail sales, to focus on developing the 
film division and working out ways to market the firm and its products.  
Pathe secured significant capital much earlier than its competitors 
Grivolas used his business contacts to organise the public float of Pathe Frères that produced 
one million francs in capital enabling it to plan for systematic growth. High profile financier 
Jean Neyret, French bank Credit Lyonnais and other institutional investors backed the new 
company. In terms of establishing a business with sufficient critical mass so that it could 
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trade on an international scale, this injection of capital in 1897 gave Pathe first mover 
advantage and an eight-year lead over future French rival Gaumont (Puttnam 1997, 29). 
The theoretical framework outlined above indicates that dominant firms are likely to 
possess a marketing orientation, develop an effective competitive strategy and possess a set 
of superior strategic marketing capabilities to their rivals. Pathe’s rise to a position of market 
dominance of world cinema will now be evaluated through that theoretical lens.  
Pathe employed a quality-based strategy 
Porter (1984) outlines three basic competitive strategies: quality (based on product 
differentiation), cost-leadership (low prices) and focus (serving a niche market segment). 
Pathe’s competitive strategy was clearly based on quality. The firm mass-manufactured high 
quality cameras and projectors (Zukor 1953, 20) that diffused widely around the world. The 
Pathe Rooster trademark was widely recognised by cinema audiences on every continent 
(Abel 1994, 49) and Pathe strategically marketed its corporate image and trademark, 
positioning it as a quality brand through its marketing communications (Abel 1999, 17). 
Pathe established a sustainable competitive advantage over rivals through scale 
economies provided by its manufacturing business and a vast network of sales offices 
stretched across the world and discussed below. None of the firm’s competitors operated on a 
scale of that magnitude.  
Pathe was a marketing orientated firm, its competitors were not 
Marketing orientated firms have well-developed market sensing capabilities and are 
externally focused on the market and customers, designing products that satisfy customers’ 
needs and desires (in this case entertaining audiences). 
In terms of market sensing, the evidence shown below in Table 2 indicates that Pathe 
read the American market more successfully than its rivals. While U.S. competitors were 
cutting back production in 1904-1907, Pathe geared up in 1904 and again in 1906 to meet the 
  
 - 12 -  
exploding demand in both the U.S. market (from the nickelodeon theatre boom) and within 
its home market in France (due to a wave of cinema construction). 
Another example of Pathe’s strategic marketing orientation and market sensing 
capabilities was the earlier choice of location for its two sales offices in America. New York 
and Chicago were the two largest cities and were experiencing the most rapid growth in 
urban population. The choice of those two cities enabled Pathe to effectively sense and 
monitor the changing dynamic in the American market just as the nickelodeon boom took off. 
This enabled Pathe to target this emerging high-growth segment at a time when major U.S. 
rivals Edison and Biograph continued to focus primarily on the higher yielding vaudeville 
segment of the market for their equipment and short film sales, which were sold at a standard 
price of 15 cents per foot.  
 
Table 2.   Films released in the U.S. market by the major film companies 1903-1908  
US FIRMS 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 
Biograph 597 326 155 134 123 116 
Edison 334 325 111 54 54 69 
Lubin 592 156 84 126 112 189 
Selig 169 22 5 18 34 65 
EUROPEANS       
Pathe 30 179 81 219 377 460 
George Kleine 
Euro imports 
87 245 132 3 
anomaly? 
363 564 
Gaumont 17 62 7 16 171 217 
Source: AFI Catalog data 
 
Pathe realised that nickelodeons as start-up businesses, with heavy initial outgoings, would 
respond more positively to firms offering a value package that included quality projectors and 
high quality films at affordable prices, so Pathe ‘packaged’ its film equipment offerings and 
adopted a market penetration pricing strategy in the U.S. by offering films for sale at a more 
affordable 12 cents per foot (Csida and Csida 1978, 132-134; Abel 1994, 23). 
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Pathe’s worldwide network of sales offices provided a channel for market intelligence 
on changing market conditions in each country to be fed back to ‘head office’ in Paris.  With 
cinema programs changing once or twice per week, the sales offices were in regular contact 
with exhibitors that they serviced in order to meet weekly programming needs and different 
markets required different kinds of films. Evidence of the sales network operating in a 
market-sensing capacity can be seen in Pathe’s decision to expand the number of sales offices 
in Russia, less than two years after entering that market. In order to provide adequate market 
coverage they moved from the initial base in Moscow to St Petersburg and then to Odessa. 
By 1908, Pathe’s entry into the Russian market was already yielding outstanding results with 
the Russian market already grown to 50% the size of Pathe’s revenues from the enormous 
U.S. market (Abel 1994). 
Market sensing is also evident in Pathe’s later decision to alter strategy and establish 
affiliate production companies in the biggest export markets. Their mission was to produce 
local films to satisfy local market tastes (Abel 1999, 173). This indicates that Pathe was well 
aware of differences in audience tastes for entertainment in various markets (see Abel 1999, 
90-91; 156). 
Additional marketing intelligence was provided to Pathe after it established the 
weekly trade paper The Views and Film Index. Journalists writing for that paper obviously 
needed to be externally focused and observing industry trends and developments to be able to 
write a regular trade newspaper that would sell. Editorial staff thus provided another market-
sensing channel for Pathe just as modern counterparts like Variety and Screen International 
do today for film industry professionals. 
The Motion Picture Weekly (MPW) reported in July 1911 that Pathe was ’the first 
(film company) to get in touch with the exhibitor and study his requirements’ (Abel 1999, 
177).  MPW was a high profile industry trade paper, which indicates that Pathe undertook 
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some form of market research and relationship marketing with the exhibition sector and the 
movie theatre chains that emerged around 1911. There is no evidence that any of the other 
pioneering film companies conducted formal studies of exhibitor or audience behaviour. 
Charles Pathe began his career selling phonographs in the Parisian fairgrounds that 
were to become the first mass market for film exhibition in France prior to the formation of 
permanent cinema chains. Puttnam (1998, 26) observed  ‘sharing their social background he 
had an instinctive understanding of his customers’ i.e. fairground exhibitors and the public. 
He also travelled widely to keep up to date with developments in different countries (Abel 
1999, 89). During a 1907 trip America, Pathe said: ‘Despite the company’s record-breaking 
business that fall, the New York and Chicago offices remained uneasy because of the 
persistent unsettled conditions created by the proliferating nickelodeons and rental 
exchanges’ (Abel 1999). 
In late 1913, the New York Times reported that Charles Pathe embarked on a fact-
finding mission to study the American film market first-hand:  
‘to investigate the motion picture industry here and to suggest improvement. I have 
recently travelled much and have studied the motion picture industry all over the 
world and I am satisfied with conditions everywhere except in the United States’ 
(New York Times 1913). 
In contrast, Thomas Edison whose film studio was a major rival, was first and foremost an 
inventor and personally more focused on the technology and demonstrated little interest in 
films or changing market conditions (Zukor 1953, 19-20). Another competitor, Biograph’s 
President Jeremiah Kennedy, was a conservative banker who refused to innovate in a rapidly 
evolving market (Wasko 1978, 33). Kennedy told Zukor: ‘The time is not ripe for feature 
pictures, if it ever will be’ (Zukor 1953, 73-74) less than two years before Birth of a Nation 
became the first feature film to become a box office blockbuster. 
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The historical evidence supports the contention that Pathe excelled in the 
implementation of a primitive but effective marketing research / marketing information 
system, one of the six key marketing capabilities exhibited by market-driven firms that 
continually achieve superior business performance to their rivals as identified by Vorhies and 
Harker (2000). Pathe was clearly more attuned to its customers and audiences than rivals. 
Pathe had superior new product development capabilities 
By 1898 the public was tiring of the ‘endless diet of scenics and topicals’ (Puttnam 1997, 31). 
In response, Pathe hired Ferdinand Zecca to lead the film studio and make longer more 
entertaining narrative films. In 1901 he made the six-part The Story of a Crime that Bousquet 
(2004) described as ‘stylishly innovative in its use of superimposition’ and introduced movie 
audiences to the serial as a genre. Under Zecca, in 1901, Pathe began producing elaborate 
feerie (fairy tale) films such as Fairy of the Black Rocks and Sleeping Beauty for which 
French cinema became famous and had wide appeal to families with children. The studio also 
made social dramas like Victimes de l’alcoolism (1902) to entertain mature audiences. 
The popularity of feerie films and comedies helped to fuel market demand for more 
narrative films. Pathe mass-produced a wide variety of different genres including dramas, 
comedies, westerns and epic films like the box office hit The Passion Play (1907) and it’s 
popular newsreel was introduced later. The studio’s breadth of productions was designed to 
match the programming needs of the nickelodeons in America that wanted a regular supply 
of a wide variety of short films (Abel 1999, 10). Critical to Pathe’s success was that it 
produced different kinds of films (genres) to satisfy the entertainment needs of different types 
of audiences (market segments) demonstrating that Pathe understood that in order to create 
popular mass entertainment, an audience-centred approach is necessary. 
Pathe’s massive studio complex in Vincennes produced a large slate of high quality 
films. Production staff were organised into directors units shooting in parallel at one of the 
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three Pathe studios outside Paris. They produced one film per week from 1903 and one film 
per day from 1906 (Abel 1994, 20-22). Pathe was the first studio to hand-colour films using a 
stencilling process that in later years became automated. Coloured films were very popular 
with audiences particularly in America (Abel 1999, 40-47). Pathe also invented the inter-title 
cards that appeared between scenes in its silent films enabling the audience to read the 
dialogue and scene descriptions. They helped Pathe sell films in export markets where the 
cards could be translated at low cost into local languages. And in later years, Pathe would 
also produce many serials including the big hit, Perils of Pauline (Abel 1999). 
The historical evidence presented indicates that high quality and innovation were the 
corner stones of Pathe’s production strategy and that its manufacturing operation had the 
resources to mass produce these films to satisfy audiences around the world. Pathe was 
highly innovative and excelled in new product development, another of the six key marketing 
capabilities of a superior performing company (Vorhies and Harker 2000). 
Pathe had significantly superior distribution capabilities to rivals 
Pathe established the first formal distribution structure in France through the creation of six 
regional distribution companies to service its national cinema chain comprising 200 cinemas 
(Kindem 2000, 196). It strategically planned and controlled its distribution channels by 
shrewdly exploiting growth opportunities more effectively than its competitors. In France, it 
initially targeted the fairgrounds as exhibition customers because in the early years of silent 
film, permanent cinemas did not exist, so with 75% of fairground operators using Pathe 
projectors, it effectively monopolized that segment (Abel 1994, 22-24). 
Pathe was the first mover of any size and scale into international distribution (Table 
3) and in doing so it established a competitive advantage that lasted for over a decade. Its 
international network of sales offices provided intensive market coverage on an unrivalled 
scale and eliminated the need for third party agent representation, thereby reducing 
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transaction costs and enabling more rapid diffusion of its equipment and films by eliminating 
third parties. And as a vertically integrated producer-distributor-exhibitor (in France), Pathe 
was able to provide its film studio and distribution arm with guaranteed release of films in its 
own domestic chain of 200 luxury cinemas as well as in 75% of the fairground market. 
Table 3.  International distribution arrangements for larger film companies - 1894-1914 
EUROPE: PATHE & U.S. firms film 
distribution arrangements/ 
U.S. MARKET: PATHE & European firms film 
distribution arrangements 
1894   Maguire & Baucus London agent for  
           Edison 
1903   Edison sells equipment through its     
          phonograph company in London 
1904   PATHE OPENS IN MOSCOW 
           PATHE OPENS IN BRUSSELS 
1905   PATHE OPENS IN BERLIN 
          PATHE OPENS IN VIENNA 
          PATHE OPENS IN ST PETERSBURG 
1906   Vitagraph opens London office 
          PATHE OPENS IN AMSTERDAM 
          PATHE OPENS IN BARCELONA 
          PATHE OPENS IN MILAN 
          PATHE OPENS IN LONDON 
          PATHE OPENS IN ODESSA 
1909   Agent in Berlin for Lubin  
          PATHE OPENS IN MANILA 
1909   Vitagraph agents in six European capitals 
1909   Markt – London agent for Lubin & Selig 
1909   Essanay London office 
1909   Markt office in Berlin (Lubin & Selig) 
1902   Melies Star Films (France) NY office  
1904   PATHE OPENS IN NEW YORK  
1989 Cines (Italy) NY office 
1904   Miles Brothers US agent for European firms  
1904   Kleine US agent for Urban (Britain) 
1904   Williams, Brown & Earle agent for Hepworth     
           (Britain) 
1906   PATHE OPENS IN CHICAGO 
1908   Williamson (Australia) NY office 
1908   Great Northern (Britain) NY office 
1908   Lux (France) American branch 
1908   Raleigh (Britain) 
1908 Film Import agent for Raleigh & Robert (Britain) 
1910   Agent in Britain/France for IMP films 
1910   IMP office in Berlin 
1910   British agent for Kalem 
1910   Selig has agents in 4 European capitals 
1910   Berlin agent for Essanay 
1910   Gaumont - London agent for Thanhouser 
1910  Markt opens Milan office (Lubin & Selig) 
1910  Agent in London/Paris for Champion 
1910  Market agent in Europe for Kalem 
1910    Éclair (France) NY office 
1910    Sales Company agent for French/Italian firms 
 
 
1911  Selig now selling direct in London 
1911  Kalem has London & Berlin branches 
1911  Essanay Berlin branch 
 
 
 
1912  Selig branches in London, Berlin &         
          St Petersburg and an agent in Budapest 
1912  Essanay branches London & Barcelona 
1912  Lubin branches London & Berlin 
1912  Romanian agent for Vitagraph 
1912    Kleine agent for Cines (Italy) & Eclipse (France) 
1912   Ambrosia (Italy) forms US subsidiary 
1913  Spanish agent for Warner Brothers 
1913  Selig branches in Paris & Budapest 
1913  Famous Players office in London 
1913  Universal branches Berlin & Copenhagen 
1913   Vivaphone agent for Hepworth 
1913    NY agents for smaller Europeans 
 
 
1914  PATHE OPERATED    
          41 FOREIGN BRANCHES 
1914   PATHE OPERATED 31 SALES      
           OFFICES IN THE U.S. MARKET 
Sources: Thompson (1985, 194 – 212) and Abel (1994, 23) 
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Segrave (1997) argues that a critical success factor was Pathe’s strategy of opening 
local offices ‘in a country or area as soon as the market became big enough’.  This gave the 
firm local first-mover advantage in distribution. Pathe began its American operation by 
establishing sales offices in New York from 1904 and in Chicago from 1906 to take 
advantage of the burgeoning demand created by the nickelodeon boom. Pathe’s quality films 
and range of genres (Table 4) ideally suited the kind of variety needed by nickelodeon 
owners to program 30-60 minute shows (Abel 1999, 28-34). 
Table 4.  A selection of Pathe titles listed by genre - 1900-1916 
Drama Comedy Westerns Fantasy / Children’s films 
The Story of a Crime (1901) 
Alcohol and its Victims 
(1902) 
The Gambler’s Crime (1903) 
The Strike (1904) 
French Coal Miners (1905) 
aka The Life of a Miner  
Revolution in Russia (1905) 
The Hooligans of Paris 
(1905) 
The Female Spy (1906) 
Phial of Poison (1907) 
The Black Princess (1908) 
The Man Monkey (1909 
What Happened to the 
Inquisitive Janitor? (1901) 
Cadet’s First Smoke (1902)  
The Clever Baker (1904) 
Two Young Tramps (1905) 
An Exciting Honeymoon 
(1906) 
The Boireau series (1906-
1908) 
Max Learns to Skate (1907) 
The Runaway Horse (1908) 
Max and the Lady Doctor 
(1909) 
The Rigadin series (1910) 
Indians and Cowboys (1904) 
Justice of a Redskin (1908) 
A Western Hero (1909) 
Cowboy Justice (1910) 
The Girl from Arizona (1910) 
The Cowboy’s Sweetheart 
and the Bandit (1910) 
A Cheyenne Brave (1910) 
The Indian and the Maid 
(1910) 
The Cowboy’s Innocence 
(1911) 
The Horse Thief (1912) 
The Sheriff’s Reward (1912) 
Little Tom Thumb (1901) 
Fairy of the Black Rocks 
(1902)  
Sleeping Beauty (1902)  
Puss-in-Boots (1903)  
A Princess in Disguise 
(1904) 
The Hen that laid the Golden 
Eggs (1905) 
The Magic Flute (1906) 
Aladdin and his Wonder 
Lamp (1906) 
Cinderella (1907) 
Beauty and the Beast (1908) 
Historical Romance Classics & Art Films 
produced by Film d’Art & 
SCAGL - Pathe Distibution 
War  
The Passion Play (1902) 
Life of Napoleon (1903)   
William Tell (1903)  
Life of Louis XIV (1904) 
Christopher Columbus 
(1904) 
Quo Vadis (1904) 
The Assassination of the 
Duke of Guise (1908) 
Joan of Arc (1909) 
Vercingetorix (1909) 
Love at Each Floor (1903) 
Annie’s Love Story (1904) 
The Bewitched Lover (1905) 
Harlequin’s Story (1907) 
A Woman’s Heart (1909) 
The Romance of a Poor Girl 
(1909) 
Miss Moneybags Wishes to 
Wed (1910) 
A Romantic Girl (1910) 
A Western Courtship (1911) 
L’Arlesienne (1908) 
La Grande Breteche (1909)  
La Tosca (1909) 
MacBeth (1909) 
Carmen (1910) 
Cleopatra (1910) 
Madame Sans-Gene (1911) 
Notre Dame de Paris (1911) 
Les Miserables (1911) 
Faust (1911) 
Il Trovatore (1911) 
1812 (1910) 
In the Days of War (1913) 
The Last Volunteer (1914) 
Neal of the Navy (1915) 
My Country First (1916) 
 
 
Serials Newsreels Scenics Actualities / Topicals 
The Perils of Pauline (1914)  
The Exploits of Elaine (1915)  
The Mysteries of Myra 
(1916)  
The Iron Claw (1916)  
Pearl of the Army (1916)  
The Red Circle (1916)  
The Grip of Evil (1916) 
Who’s Guilty (1916) 
The Shielding Shadow (1916) 
Pathe-Journal (1908)  
Pathe Weekly (1911)  
Trip Through Europe (1902)  
The River Ozu, Japan (1906) 
Picturesque Canada (1907)  
Picturesque Java (1907) 
Across the Island of Ceylon 
(1909)  
A Visit to Bombay (1909)  
La Catastrophe de la 
Martinique (1902) 
A Butterfly’s Metamorphosis 
(1904) 
Japanese Women (1907)  
Coffee Culture (1908) 
The Reception of the 
American Fleet in Australia 
(1908)  
Wilbur Wright’s Aeroplane 
(1908) 
In Ancient Greece (1910) 
Sources: Abel (1999, 182-185); IMDb (http://www.imdb.com/company/co0130355/) 
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At a time when the largest U.S. producers were cutting back their production output 
during the nickelodeon boom (Table 2) and despite intensifying competition from European 
studios like Gaumont, Cines and Nordisk who were also major exporters to America, Pathe 
films were in such high demand that exhibitors took Pathe programs on a standing order 
contract in order to guarantee their supply.  Such advance orders for a block of films provided 
certainty to Pathe’s distribution operation and the funds to self-finance forthcoming 
productions. This occurred because as a distributor, Pathe had sole access to the world’s most 
popular film product, mass manufactured in its own studios in France and later from its 
American based studios. The Pathe trademark and brand was well-known worldwide and 
signaled quality product to both the exhibitors who bought their projectors and films and to 
paying audiences.  Consequently, Pathe was able to book a much wider release for its films 
than its competitors. Trade magazine Moving Picture World reported Pathe sold 75 copies of 
at least six film titles per year at a time when other studios had normal print runs that were 
considerably smaller (Abel 1994, 24). 
Pathe realised that bigger profits were more likely in film distribution than from film 
equipment manufacturing (Puttnam 1997, 36), so as market demand escalated for longer 
narrative films, the increasing profits from distribution offset the financial risks of making 
bigger budget films; Pathe was able to self-finance its film production activities from those 
same distribution profits. 
The firm’s market power was facilitated by its ability to distribute its films, cameras 
and projectors through this global distribution network at a time when competitors would not 
or could not compete on that scale internationally. At its peak, Pathe operated 31 sales offices 
throughout the United States (Bakker 2003, 28) and an international network of 41 sales 
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offices from New York to Bombay (Segrave 1997, 3).  ‘By 1909, Pathe worldwide sales were 
double the combined total of all producers in the United States’ (Cawkell and Smith 1972). 
The historical evidence cited supports the contention that Pathe excelled in the 
implementation of effective distribution strategies, another of the six key marketing 
capabilities commonly found in market-driven companies that achieve superior business 
performance (Vorhies and Harker 2000). 
Pathe’s superior pricing capabilities 
In 1904 Pathe rapidly gained market share in the booming American market (Table 2) using a 
market penetration pricing strategy to ensure the rapid take-up by the nickelodeons. Pathe 
sold films three cents per foot cheaper than rivals (Abel 1994, 23).  In 1907 the firm switched 
from outright sales of films to a fixed-fee rental system in which newer, longer films rented 
for higher prices than older, shorter films. Pathe negotiated an agreed fixed percentage of box 
office takings for the newer films (Abel 1994, 33), which was a switch to a premium pricing 
strategy that optimised Pathe’s financial returns, as well as relieving the financial burden on 
exhibitors to regularly buy new films even if they had a short shelf life. It also enabled 
exhibitors to change their programming more frequently at a time when consumer demand 
was increasing dramatically. And it helped extend the shelf-life of Pathe’s films, because 
upon return they could be re-rented to other exhibitors. All parties benefitted from this new 
arrangement. Clearly, Pathe excelled in the implementation of effective pricing strategies, 
another of the six key marketing capabilities of superior performing firms (Vorhies and 
Harker 2000). 
Pathe’s superior promotional / communications capabilities 
In terms of promotional capabilities, Pathe employed a range of communication 
strategies to promote its corporate image and to persuade audiences to see its films. It used 
brand advertising in the trade press to promote the firm’s corporate image to the exhibition 
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sector and to movie audiences and the Pathe Rooster signalled quality entertainment (Abel 
1999, 14-15; 44). Pathe’s international sales network was its primary strength for the global 
diffusion of its cameras and projectors. The films provided the firm with intensive coverage 
of all key markets and closer personalised relationships with exhibitors than rivals that used 
sales agents. 
Abel (1999) provides historical evidence that Pathe implemented well-orchestrated 
advertising and publicity campaigns to promote its corporate image in the United States and 
to launch its art-house production affiliate SCGAL in France. These campaigns involved use 
of co-ordinated marketing campaigns in the national press on Sundays, advertising in national 
magazines, the use of posters and promotional booklets for its films and the implementation 
of publicity campaigns (Abel 1999, 177-179). Pathe was the first film company to use posters 
as a promotional tool to create awareness of its films as forthcoming attractions (Abel 1999). 
The one-sheet poster has since become one of the primary marketing tools in the film 
industry. 
Co-owner of Pathe’s new Omnia Cinema, lawyer Edmond Benoit Levy, wrote an 
editorial in a leading cine journal Phono-Cine-Gazette, which argued that film should be 
elevated from its low fairground status to an art form (Puttnam 1998, 54-55). It took a five-
year campaign of political lobbying but cinema did eventually achieve social legitimacy 
when the French President attended the gala opening of the 1911 film season at an opulent 
Omnia-Pathe theatre in Paris. This indicates a sophisticated use of strategic public relations 
designed to change the perceptions of key stakeholders and influence them to support a 
particular cause. 
Such historical examples support the contention that Pathe excelled in the 
implementation of effective promotions / communications strategies, another of the six key 
marketing capabilities displayed by superior performing firms (Vorhies and Harker 2000). 
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Pathe’s superior strategic marketing management capabilities 
The evidence demonstrates that Pathe was a marketing orientated firm that monitored 
and shaped the business environment and strategically managed its marketing capabilities to 
create a competitive advantage. Pathe’s initial strategy of pre-emption succeeded until 1908. 
It began when Pathe embarked upon a rapid expansion program to build an industrial empire 
consisting of the mass manufacturing of cameras, projectors, phonographs and films, 
supported by a network of overseas sales offices through which to diffuse its products 
(equipment and films) worldwide. This gave Pathe first-mover market advantage when its 
competitors simply did not have the capacity to challenge. 
Pathe was outwardly focused on the external business environment and strategically 
exploited key opportunities. Abel (1994) notes that in early 1905 a French court had ruled 
that cinema closely resembled legitimate theatre which was controlled by the Government 
and had no censorship restrictions. Cinema on the other hand was classified as a popular 
amusement and fell under the control of local municipal officials who had the right to censor 
films and did. Pathe realised that failure to elevate the status of cinema would likely condemn 
film exhibition to the French fairgrounds and thereby miss opportunities to diffuse it more 
widely to the burgeoning middle classes that were emerging in France as the nation 
underwent rapid industrialisation. However, good fortune favoured the French film industry 
when the government mandated a weekend for workers in July 1906. This created leisure 
time for working people and Pathe saw that the middle classes with rising disposable income 
would require additional leisure time facilities (Puttnam 1997, 36), but France lacked a 
critical mass of permanent cinemas capable of satisfying potential demand. 
In the previous two years, a sudden explosion of demand for Pathe films occurred in 
the American market following the establishment of film exchanges in 1902, and the 
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emergence of nickelodeon theatres from 1904 that rapidly diffused across America creating a 
critical mass of audience demand for more films. The ability of nickelodeons to access a 
consistent supply of new product hinged critically on the distribution role of the film 
exchanges.  ‘Power would accrue to anyone who could supply a consistently high output of 
quality product’ (Puttnam 1997, 36), and this is what distinguished Pathe from rivals in 
America during the nickelodeon boom (Abel 1999). 
The expanding exhibition market in French fairgrounds, combined with Pathe’s 
significant export success to the U.S. market during the nickelodeon frenzy, delivered two 
years of escalating revenues and corporate profits. Pathe’s channel dominance of fairground 
exhibition in France shutout local competitors as did the firm’s strategy to develop a network 
of international sales offices in Europe and America, which enabled the rapid diffusion of its 
films. By this point, two thirds of Pathe’s revenues were now realised from its film division 
(Abel 1994, 20-23). 
For Pathe, the financial break-even point on narrative films was the sale of twelve 
film prints, but on average the company actually sold in excess of 30 prints per film (Abel 
1999, 23). This demonstrated the critical importance of controlling distribution and signalled 
its enormous potential to further enhance company profits. It was Pathe’s distribution strategy 
involving development of a wide network of sales offices from 1904-06 across Europe in 
Moscow, Brussels, Berlin, Vienna, St Petersburg, Amsterdam, Barcelona, Milan, London and 
initially in America’s two largest cities – New York and Chicago – that provided the 
company with a sustainable competitive advantage. Pathe’s competitors lacked the financial 
resources, the capability, the necessary marketing orientation or perhaps the strategic will to 
duplicate Pathe’s network at this time. 
In 1906, with the exception of Edison and Biograph, American firms were generally 
undercapitalised and could not or would not meet surge in demand from the nickelodeon 
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boom in their home market. After meetings with Thomas Edison, Adolph Zukor wrote that 
Edison did not believe in the commercial potential of the new movie industry and believed 
that his studio should make films based on American literary works (Zukor 1953,10). Based 
on this evidence, it can be concluded that Edison Manufacturing was not market orientated 
and simply did not detect – or possibly ignored – the sudden explosive growth of the 
nickelodeons that catered to the urban working classes and the waves of new immigrants who 
spoke virtually no English and to whom American literary works meant very little or nothing 
at all.  In addition, the financial resources of the American studios were also being drained by 
Edison’s lengthy litigation battles against each of them for patent infringement, a strategy he 
had previously used successfully to undermine rivals in the electric light industry (Reich 
1992). 
In France, Pathe’s closest challenger Gaumont only became a public company in 1905 
(eight years after Pathe). Prior to entering the film industry in 1896 as a film equipment 
manufacturer, Leon Gaumont came from a technical background and although he had 
previously owned a photography shop, it was just the retail outlet for his workshop (Mannone 
2007). His secretary, Alice Guy, had in the early years made some short promotional films to 
help sell Gaumont’s cameras and projectors, but during the period under study here, the firm 
appears to have been primarily technically focused (Garcon 1994, 14-23). 
It was in this market environment that Pathe developed a market segmentation 
strategy that would re-position the company and enable it to tap latent demand in the French 
market. It opened the Omnia-Pathe cinema in Paris as the forerunner of a chain of luxury 
cinemas – the first in the world (Kindem 2000, 196), which specifically targeted the growing 
French middle class and their increased leisure time (Kindem 2000, 196): 
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‘In order to expand the market base beyond the clientele of the fairs and to attract a 
large urban white-collar and bourgeois audience on a more consistent basis, in 
November 1906, Pathe Frères in association with a new Benoit-Levy company, 
embarked on a long-range project [the author’s underlining] of constructing a circuit 
of permanent cinemas throughout France. The first in Paris, the 300 seat Omnia-Pathe 
opened on December 15, 1906. Within weeks, other Pathe cinemas began springing 
up across the capital and as far away as Lyon, Marseille, Bordeaux and Toulouse’ 
(Abel 1994, 30). 
The national circuit would comprise 200 cinemas by 1911 and would guarantee an 
exhibition outlet for Pathe films and those from other studios being distributed by the 
company. With film budgets rising due to the production of increasingly longer narrative 
films to satisfy growing middle class demand for better quality, Pathe knew from experience 
that even in an expanding market, film distribution was a much more predictable business 
with far less risk than film production (Puttnam 1997, 36). Consequently Pathe decided to 
continue to expand distribution network of sales offices overseas and to formalise the non-
existent French distribution sector through establishment of a regional distribution structure 
to supply the Omnia-Pathe luxury cinema circuit. 
To spread risk and diminish French-based studios’ reliance on revenues from film 
production, Pathe established Pathe-affiliated film production companies in London, New 
York, Rome, Moscow and Brussels that would each make films tailored specifically for those 
home markets and would also feed Pathe’s growing worldwide distribution network. Pathe 
also planned to produce films based on classic French literature to entertain the emerging and 
literate middle class market segment and to gain first mover advantage over rival French 
firms. It created a differentiated film product (SCAGL literary adaptations, newsreels and 
coloured films). 
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Pathe’s strategy of creating film factories to print film stock in overseas markets with 
highest demand provided the firm with scale efficiencies through reduced costs in raw 
materials, transportation and import duty. This in turn enabled the firm to price films 
competitively in those major markets (Abel 1999, 88). Another example of the firm’s 
strategic marketing management capabilities occurred in 1907 when its New York manager 
Berst expressed concern about the level of piracy of Pathe prints by local exhibitors duping 
(counterfeiting) re-selling and sharing. Pathe responded with a counter-strategy that packaged 
an entire block of films made available to exhibitors on a weekly basis rather than allowing 
them to selectively choose what they wanted (Abel 1999, 89). 
This strategy to re-orientate his company towards an increasing focus on distribution 
and exhibition, and away from a major reliance on film production at his Paris studio, 
deliberately and strategically exploited favourable environmental conditions in France.  It 
would also offer protection for Pathe if unfavourable conditions eventuated in the 
increasingly important U.S. export market. Pathe clearly identified and strategically exploited 
changing market conditions within America and France as early as 1906, before its American 
and domestic rivals and displayed a clear audience-centred orientation. 
The evidence presented demonstrates that Pathe possessed superior strategic 
marketing management capabilities – the last of the six key marketing capabilities exhibited 
by market-driven firms that achieve superior market performance (Vorhies & Harker 2000). 
 
Conclusion 
The historical evidence presented in this paper supports the proposition that Pathe was indeed 
a marketing orientated firm that employed a quality-based competitive strategy.  The 
evidence shows that Pathe’s customer-centred approach, combined with a holistically 
managed set of superior marketing capabilities designed to serve those exhibitors and film 
  
 - 27 -  
audiences, can account for Pathe’s rise to a position of global market dominance in the early 
movie industry from around 1904-1914. 
The key lessons that can be drawn from this historical case for entertainment 
companies today is that in a highly competitive industry where audiences have seemingly 
limitless choices of how to entertain themselves, the firms that will succeed are those that 
seek to understand their customers and can create and deliver a valued entertainment 
experience that satisfies the needs and desires of their target audiences. Such entertainment 
needs to be clearly differentiated from offerings from rival firms in order to stand out in a 
cluttered market and should be designed to be easily accessible to those audiences – 
particularly in today’s multi-platform world of entertainment. Branding and effective 
marketing communications that will persuade audiences to engage with the entertainment 
experience are also fundamental to success. Without that kind of marketing orientation or the 
development of the six strategic marketing capabilities discussed in this paper, success or 
even survival in today’s highly competitive entertainment industries may prove to be elusive. 
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